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ABSTRACT  
 
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States waged its longest-
running war on Afghanistan. Military intervention was justified through representations of 
oppressed Afghan women to frame the “War on Terror” as a war for women. The Bush 
administration's war propaganda exploited the plight of Afghan women by co-opting a feminism-
as-humanitarianism framework. This approach, cloaked in universalist language, was uncritically 
accepted by the Feminist Majority Foundation’s (FMF) campaign to stop gender apartheid. 
Through careful consideration of the Bush administration and the Feminist Majority Foundation's 
Taliban-centered rhetoric, this thesis offers a critical analysis of the ahistorical and imperialist 
backdrop in which representations of Afghan women are embedded. Emphasizing the underlying 
geopolitical and economic motives of US military intervention in Afghanistan, I argue that the 
Feminist Majority Foundation is shaped by the discourse of modern US imperialism and 
appropriates a feminism-as-humanitarianism framework, which contradicts their mission. These 
contradictions reinforce the East versus West binary and are best articulated through images of 
the ubiquitous blue burqa. The Feminist Majority Foundation and the Bush administration’s 
rhetoric go beyond recycling the imagery and mentality of the “clash of civilizations.” The 
destructive consequences of US foreign policy and imperialism are justified by ideological 
constructions of the West versus the Islamic “Other.” This thesis raises relevant concerns of the 
role of feminist NGOs in 21st century imperial political projects. My findings insist that feminist 
solidarity should be based on geographically and culturally specific histories of struggle and 
understood through Muslim women’s interpretation of their identity and freedom, amidst and 
beyond the “War on Terror.” 
 
Keywords: Afghanistan, women, transnational feminism, humanitarianism, War on Terror, US 
imperialism, Clash of Civilizations 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
At the center of the ideological “War on Terror,” was the image of the burqa-clad Afghan 
woman. Her face was hidden; her body shapeless under a thick, cornflower-blue veil. Yet her 
mere existence simultaneously elicited outrage, pity, and shock throughout American audiences. 
It rallied a nation, regardless of partisanship, in support of the United States’ longest-running 
military presence in Afghanistan on the premise that Afghan women needed saving, and the 
United States was their savior. Lila Abu-Lughod inspired the topic of this thesis with a question: 
“do Muslim women need saving?” Her book of the same title highlighted the individual stories 
of Muslim women she met and interviewed throughout her thirty years of anthropological 
fieldwork (2013). While this thesis supports Abu-Lughod’s emphasis on Muslim women’s self-
perceived identity, my research is primarily concerned with the politics of representation.  
In an attempt to discern why Afghan women have played a central role within American 
political debate, it explores US-propagated representations of Afghan women, the context in 
which they were produced, and how they have constructed and reconstructed systems of power 
in relation to US militarism and imperialism. Through careful analysis of representations of 
Afghan women, my thesis documents the ways mainstream feminist rhetoric has been co-opted 
by the Bush administration and uncritically joined by the Feminist Majority Foundation’s (FMF) 
Campaign to Stop Gender Apartheid following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. I 
argue that the FMF, shaped by the discourse of modern US imperialism, contradicts its own 
feminist mission. It aligns itself with the feminism-as-humanitarianism framework appropriated 
by the Bush administration, which obscures the geopolitical and economic motives of US 
military intervention in Afghanistan. These contradictions reinforce the binary construction of 
the ‘clash of civilizations’ and are best articulated through images of the ubiquitous blue burqa.  
    
METHODOLOGY 
 
My thesis draws from press releases, radio and public addresses, online articles, congressional 
testimonies and images across global, national, and local capacities to discern trends and 
disparities found in Taliban-centered rhetoric. Specifically, it refers to the Feminist Majority 
Foundation, former First Lady Laura Bush, the Office of Global Women’s Issues under the US 
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Department of State, the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council, the Revolutionary Association of 
Women of Afghanistan, and Time Magazine as primary sources.  
It structures its findings as follows: First, it examines the rise of transnational feminist 
alliances within human rights advocacy to contextualize the politics of feminist intervention, 
arguing that the universalizing discourses of feminism have separated the global and the local, 
effectively obscuring the geopolitical interconnections between the two and reinforcing the 
moral superiority of the former. It must be understood here that I refer to “feminism” as it is used 
by the FMF and in war propaganda— based exclusively on Western feminist principles which 
have been universalized across cultural contexts. It then outlines the history of Afghanistan, 
exposing the imperial powers, policies, and interventions which have contributed to its failure as 
a modern nation-state and the rise of Islamic extremist groups. After establishing FMF’s link 
with the Bush administration, as well as its dissimilarities, it delves into the political work of the 
Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan, who opposed both US imperialism and 
Islamic fundamentalism, and their role in local representations of Afghan women within human 
rights advocacy.  
Organized thematically, my research proceeds to analyze specific US representations of 
Afghan women, distinguishing four trends: (1) American nationalism and idealized notions of 
citizenship are defined in association to a feminist rescue in Afghanistan, which I refer to as 
gendered nationalism, (2) gendered nationalism embedded in free-market capitalism and defines 
freedom as the freedom to consume, (3) the rise of the Taliban is constructed as an overnight 
phenomenon, and (4) references to Afghanistan during its so-called “Golden Age” is described 
as a period of women’s empowerment and freedom. An analysis of the social, political, and 
cultural implications of representations concludes with the manifestation of the “clash of 
civilization” in selective imagery of Afghan women.  
 
HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY AND TRANSNATIONAL FEMINISM 
 
Following the tragic attacks on 9/11 and in the spirit of combating global terrorism, Laura Bush 
called on Americans to unite across partisanship to rescue Afghan women. She framed the “War 
on Terror” as a war for the “rights and dignity of women” (L. Bush  2001). The State 
collaborated with the Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF), a US-based transnational feminist 
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organization, in an effort to publicize the plight of Afghan women at the expense of collapsing 
their oppression to the burqa, assuming their complete lack of autonomy, and obscuring the 
complicit role US foreign policy has played in Afghan women’s current misfortune. As a means 
to contextualize the sudden popularity of ‘waging war for women’ evident in several sources 
cited below, I will examine the spectrum of representation across State-sponsored and explicitly 
feminist discourse. 
Transnational feminist debates on intervention in Afghanistan tends to thread a fine line 
between two tropes: “women rights as human rights” and “feminism-as-imperialism.” The Bush 
administration’s sudden feminist imperative has been disparaged for its poorly-veiled intentions 
by several feminists and scholars who lean towards the latter.1 Conversely, it was supported by 
Western-based feminist organizations who lean towards the former. I focus on the former, 
specifically on the Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF), for two reasons. First, FMF is one of 
the first and most effective US-based feminist organizations to respond to the plight of Afghan 
women. Its campaign to “Stop Gender Apartheid” was initiated in 1996 and is perhaps the most 
wide-reaching, well-known campaign geared towards Afghan women and girls. In a 
congressional testimony, Eleanor Smeal, the president of FMF, states that the campaign’s 
objective is “to raise public awareness about the treatment of women and girls in Afghanistan 
and to urge the U.S. and the U.N. to do all in their power to restore the rights of women and to 
address this humanitarian disaster” (Feminist Daily Newswire 2001a). The second reason is its 
influence and allegiance within the U.S. government’s foreign policy. Smeal prides FMF’s 
success in influencing US policymakers and government officials. After the attacks on 9/11, 
FMF served as the major feminist source for former President Bush, mainstream media, and 
charitable foundations (Lerner 2001). FMF’s sudden momentum is attributed to the moral 
mainstreaming of “women’s rights as humans rights” and the international human rights 
community’s focus on Third World women. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, and throughout the 1990s, a heightened awareness and 
interest in women’s rights around the globe has led to major developments in the international 
human rights field. In “Claiming Afghan Women,” Amy Farrell and Patrice McDermott attribute 
this phenomenon to the conservative backlash in the U.S. during the 1970s, which worked to 
stagnate the previous progress accomplished by US feminists and advocates of equitable 
                                               
1 Such feminist scholars include Sonali Kolhatkar, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Ann Russo. 
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education, employment, sexual rights, and affirmative action (45). Feminism at this time was 
also facing critique for its lack of racial intersectionality within an American context. Focus 
turned from domestic issues and policies to look beyond the border at the global atrocities 
suffered by culturally and geographically distant women. These atrocities— female genital 
mutilation, honor crimes, and mandatory veiling, among a myriad of other issues, were 
considered antithetical to Western liberalism, therefore easier to condemn, broadcast, and 
mobilize. A mainstream shift was a “strategic diversion from a fragmented domestic politics,” 
Farrell and McDermott insist, that found oppressive practices in the East were more politically 
neutral and thus easier for American audiences to swallow (47).  
The horrific accounts of sexual violence amidst the Bosnia and Kosovo conflict shocked 
the international community and helped legitimize violence against women as its own category 
entitled to international human rights protection. Feminists took advantage of the attention 
amassed by the conflict to pressure international and state institutions to commit to providing 
gender-specific aid. Several established intergovernmental organizations, including but not 
limited to the United Nations, the European Community, and the Organization on Security and 
Cooperation, altered future projects and resolutions in coordination with local actors to 
accommodate to the specific needs of women (Mertus 22). Feminist transnational alliances have 
since rested on a reformed human rights advocacy divided between the local and the global. 
By nature, modern human rights advocacy and transnational feminism are rooted in 
moral abstractions, separated by geopolitics into the local and global, and given shape by the 
documentation of abused victims. The local constitutes women and organizations in Third World 
contexts, and the global is collectively defined by Western-led activism (Farrell & McDermott 
38-42) . Theoretically, human rights and transnational feminist advocacy are a collaboration 
between the local and the global, who both share relatively similar degrees of influence. These 
negotiations are an exchange, intended to be symbiotic. The victims are given the platform and 
authority to amplify their experiences on a local level as a call for help, and the international 
community can credibly place pressure on the perpetrators or intervene by virtue of universal 
human rights. Farrell and McDermott contend that this is rarely the case; in feminist alliances, 
the local is excluded from sharing legitimate power possessed by global actors, and their 
authority to represent authentic experience is limited (35). Victims can express the details and 
scope of their suffering as it is framed within narratives constructed by more powerful entities 
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such as U.S. transnational organizations like the Feminist Majority Foundation or the U.S. State 
Department.  
The commonly heard phrase, “women’s rights are human rights” has since been echoed 
across feminist speeches, political campaigns, and advocacy on all levels. At its center, is a claim 
to universal values. Appealing to universals is a powerful tool because it conveys a neutral 
inclusivity devoid of politics and culture. Under such an all-encompassing phrase, there seems to 
be a community open to everyone. Its legitimacy seems unassailable when human rights and 
women’s rights language “now has tremendous currency” (Abu-Lughod 81). A universal moral 
discourse, shaped by human rights language and largely fixated on women’s rights, serves as the 
measure of humanity which favors Western nations as moral authorities obligated to rescue 
Third World women. Its appeal is rooted in its optimism; if universal human rights standards are 
consistently pressured onto a society, or if a third party intervenes, it will inevitably lead to 
progression and liberation. Narratives of this nature should not necessarily be critiqued for their 
optimism; my thesis does not admonish the hope, if assumed genuine, the US government and 
FMF have for Afghan women’s future. It considers the ways in which representations can 
alienate and demoralize the cultures of the women they aim to help, potentially hindering 
widespread acceptance of cultural difference.  
This is not to suggest that violence against women, regardless of where it transpires, 
should not be amplified, researched, and reprehended throughout the international community. 
There are several positive factors of universalist discourse on women’s rights: it has gained 
effective institutional enforcement apparatuses and legitimacy in the public sphere. Violence 
against women committed in private is now considered a major public concern deserving of just 
punishment (Keck & Sikkink 1-38). “Naming and shaming” as a tactic to raise awareness of 
injustices around the world can encourage legal reform and provide preventative measures, 
trainings, and relief efforts. Grassroots and international feminist activists have leveraged this 
tactic to help elevate the rights and lives of women. However, the conversation on universal 
human right abuses is led by the very countries that violate them. The international community 
put tremendous pressure on the Taliban for their treatment of women after 9/11, admonishing 
them as the single biggest threat towards Afghan women, yet it would be hypocritical to 
condemn abuses without acknowledging how they have contributed to them.  
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Exploring the long history of internal political strife among the various ethnic groups in 
the region as well as the complex interconnections between Afghanistan and outside nation-
states is key in establishing the necessary correlation between the US and Afghanistan in 
particular, and Afghanistan and Western imperialism in general. Mapping the very real social 
and political effects of war, external influence, and constant internal instability can begin to 
challenge representations of Afghan women which attribute their suffering solely to the Taliban. 
 
IMPERIALISM AND A GEOPOLITICAL HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN 
 
A geopolitical history embedded in contentious state-society relations, radical reforms, and 
hastily crafted modernization policies has splintered Afghan society along ethnic and tribal fault 
lines, plunging the people into violence and simultaneously inhibiting it from developing into a 
functioning modern nation-state. Since its inception as a modern nation following an agreement 
between the Russians and the British after the second Anglo-Afghan War in the 19th century, 
Afghanistan has been considered a “rentier state...heavily reliant on revenue accrued from 
abroad,” granting it limited state capacity and accountability towards its polity (Rubin, 78). Push 
towards modernization have ensued a pull back to traditionalism over the course of modern 
Afghan history. This sort of ideological back and forth, Rubin contends, offers a partial 
explanation for Afghan’s overwhelming resistance to reform, with Afghanistan’s long-standing 
role as a rentier state accounting for the rest (79). In Maxine Molyneux and Shahra Razavi's 
"Gender Justice, Development, and Rights," their argument relies on the assertion that the 
"central instrument for the protection of rights has been, and must remain, the state" (24). 
Assessing Afghanistan's collapse as a nation-state in relation to its history as a rentier state bears 
relevance to Molyneux and Razavi's statement and the eventual rise of the Taliban.  
Situated between the British and Russian Empire, the two major competing imperial 
powers in the 17th and 18th century, Afghanistan became a natural buffer zone vulnerable to 
invasion and manipulation by each empire’s respective imperial agendas. In their quest towards 
monopolizing opium production in South and Central Asia, the British expanded their drug 
production and trade to Afghanistan. From then on, Kandiyoti outlines the British deployed 
military troops, dethroned of local authority, and imposed their own leaders and policies to 
protect their drug trade and maintain an advantage over Russia (172). After successively 
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invading Afghanistan in 1878, the British sought to assume control over all economic and 
foreign policy related matters by hand-picking monarchs that enforced modernization policies 
aiming to consolidate central power, generate inter-ethnic conflict, and deter Russian expansion 
in the interest of British empire-building. Afghanistan’s geographical location is not suited for 
plentiful domestic production of good and services. Only 12 percent of Afghanistan’s land is 
arable, half of which is actually cultivated due to water scarcity. Its indigenous agricultural and 
pastoral economy cannot adequately sustain its population nor does it feasibly support the 
formation of a centralized state. The consolidation of power was only feasible if foreign aid was 
provided. As such, modernization policies may have been directly instituted by an Afghan’s 
ruling elite, but British-funded arms and subsidies from 1880-1919 gave them the coercive 
means to be enforced (Rostami-Povey 9-11). Though Afghanistan was never directly colonized 
by the British, key political decision and policies affecting the nation as a whole to this day have 
been crafted under their influence.  
Afghanistan’s diversity must be acknowledged to understand its history of ethnic 
conflicts, which must be discussed sequentially to understand how Afghanistan fits within a 
broader agenda of Western empire-building and the “War on Terror.” Afghanistan’s social and 
political capital has traditionally been decentralized among dispersed heterogeneous tribes. 
Afghanistan is home to over 14 major ethnolinguistic populations and 8 major languages, and it 
has long been considered a cultural hodgepodge. The Pashtuns, constituting 42% of the overall 
population and residing in the east and south of Afghanistan, are largely Sunni Muslims, speak 
Pashto, and adhere to a code of ethics called Pashtunwali. Pashtunwali itself is practiced in 
varied degrees across individuals and communities. Several other minority ethnic groups of 
varying linguistic and cultural identities constitute the rich demographic fabric of Afghanistan. 
Its natural geography, characterized by its vast and extensive mountain ranges, and its poor road 
system have contributed to these communities’ isolation from one another and limited interaction 
over the course of history. Through time, identities have been constructed and reconstructed 
within a broader context of inter-ethnic rivalries, local wars, and colonial intervention as well as 
interethnic relations, bilingualism, and instances of social cohesion and cooperation. Under 
British influence, Afghanistan’s fragmented tribal society, and the local autonomy they each 
possessed, was forcibly amalgamated under a unified Pashtun authority to form larger modern 
state institutions. For the Afghan elite and their respective ethnic group, the consolidation of 
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tribal power provided them access to concentrated sources of wealth and political influence, 
which  was subsequently redistributed in their favor at the expense of other ethnic groups. The 
establishment of Afghanistan as a centralized modern state is in part a product of indirect 
colonial rule as much as it is a calculated consequence of the Pashtun policies that gave rise to 
internal colonization (Shahrani, 1998). Internal conflict among ethnic populations should be 
approached as the result of strategic political moves manipulated by leaders and the elite through 
a series of failed modernization policies, not as a natural outcome of a heterogeneous tribal 
society.  
Failed modernization policies, which are essentially flimsy copies of Western models of 
development, enveloped Afghanistan deeper into its role as a rentier state and exclusively 
benefited a small privileged demographic. A political pattern began to materialize through the 
20th century: Western-influenced monarchs pushed reforms on land, trade, education, healthcare, 
and women’s rights with the support of foreign aid, yet these institutions failed to evenly 
distribute resources and alleviate rural poverty, which lead to assassinations and dethroning by 
the mass. To appease the mass and the widespread distrust they harbored towards foreign 
interferers, a new monarch would step in to reverse their predecessors’ policies, omitting 
women’s rights from public reforms and reverting back to religious conservatism. Backlash from 
modernization policies and its disastrous effects on individual ethnic groups can be traced back 
to Abdur Rahman Khan’s reign from 1881-1901. Several of his successors have similarly 
repressed long-established tribal autonomies existing in the region and enacted borders which 
benefited imperial powers, but went against the needs of the Afghan people (Rostami-Povey 9). 
A tremendous lack of self-determination thwarted any attempts by centralized authority to retain 
collective control, enforce widespread taxation, and establish a shared sense of statehood over its 
own citizenry and tribal societies. This crippling, albeit predictable, pattern cannot be broken if 
Afghanistan remains a rentier state.   
Kandiyoti summarizes the history of women’s rights in Afghanistan as “a tug-of-war 
between centralizing elites, Islamic ulama resisting the encroachments of the state into their 
rightful territory, and a rural and tribal periphery intent on safeguarding its autonomy” (173). 
Zahir Shah, who ruled during Afghanistan’s “Golden Age,” was celebrated by Western 
democracies for his secularism and advancement of women’s rights. Images taken in the 1970s, 
critiqued in later sections, during the last decade of Afghanistan’s “Golden Era” are to this day 
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widely circulated and accompanied by blurbs on the thriving conditions which allowed 
Afghanistan to prosper at the time. His policies on women’s rights defined in accordance to 
Western liberalism, emanated from male elites and exclusively benefitted upper and middle class 
women in Kabul, turning Kabul into what Shams aptly calls a “bubble of prosperity” (2017). 
Unsurprisingly, his policies were tremendously unpopular among rural and working class 
women. Interpreting women’s rights through rigid secularism did not resonate with the vast rural 
population of women. It was enforced at the expense of their community’s autonomy and local 
identity, nor was it well-received by rural communities in general. As Edwards stresses, “When 
those in power overstep the bounds of their legitimate authority, it is often narrativized in terms 
of violation and emasculation. That is one reason why female education and veiling have 
perennially been such powerful and explosive issues in Afghanistan” (172–3).  
Stripped of the local resources they once had and forced to compete for foreign aid, inter-
ethnic rivalries and violence exponentially grew to unprecedented levels. Beyond a brutal 
struggle for survival, the depletion of resources and threats to local autonomy endured by 
politically excluded ethnic groups planted deep-rooted apprehension towards the state and built 
resentment towards other ethnic enclaves (Shahrani 718). The possession of local autonomy, 
especially over women’s rights, is highly valued by and tied to tribal codes of honor and 
integrity. State measures determining critical social issues in public spheres of life brutally 
clashed with tribal communities concerned with safeguarding their local autonomy. Buildup after 
years of ethnic violence and rivalries orchestrated by foreign invaders and corrupted Afghan 
elites led to an a series of bloody uprisings and assassinations.  
By 1978, the People’s Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (PDRA), a communist and 
militant group supported by the Soviet Union, had overthrown the previous government and 
continued to push for increased female public participation and literacy. The Soviet occupation 
from 1979-1989 only increased Afghanistan’s dependence on external revenue and eradicated 
indigenous cash-producing activities after its counterinsurgency tactics decimated Afghanistan’s 
rural economy. Rural populations were forcibly displaced and relocated in refugee camps in 
Pakistan and Iran or Afghan cities. PDPA’s regime swiftly ended with a series of rural 
rebellions. Categorizing the rebellions as conservative backlash against women’s advancement 
and modernization does a great injustice to the lived realities that Afghan rural communities 
suffered under the PDRA in particular, and the state in general. PDRA’s ignorance towards 
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Afghanistan’s complexities, its disbursement of wealth among an elite group of Afghan males, 
and its apparent ties with the Soviet Union fueled the rebellions and consequently sparked the 
Soviet–Afghan War (Rostami-Povey 11). Moreover, the rebellions were a culmination of a long 
string of failed reforms, including reforms affecting women, enacted by an urban based political 
elite seeking to centralize a fractious periphery. The absence of enforcing apparatuses and state 
institutions coupled with a heavy reliance on external aid, aid which did not reach the large 
majority, foiled any attempts to enforce long-term reforms.  
Distrusted as inherently corrupt and antagonistic, the state was seen as an “external and 
predatory...as a coercive apparatus that oppresses local communities through its corrupt 
bureaucracy” (Kandiyoti 158). The resistance was a response to Soviet invasion, but according to 
Rubin, it was outside countries which funded, armed, and supported certain religious extremist 
subsets within the Afghan resistance movement that created its radical Islamism elements (96). 
These subsets became known as the Mujaheddin.  
 
Mujaheddin Rule: The New War Economy 
 
Since World War II, the United States emerged as the new global power, with the Soviet Union 
serving as their rival.  Afghanistan was a critical buffer state receiving aid from opposing 
imperialistic entities. Throughout the 80s, the Soviet Union funneled $45 billions dollars in aid to 
the Afghan state, while the United States CIA, in coordination with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s 
Interservices Intelligence (ISI), and a number of other European countries, invested $5 billion 
into the Mujaheddin. It was revealed in 1998 that the CIA provided secret aid to the Mujaheddin. 
Osama bin-Laden, a Saudi elite, was a major provider to the Mujaheddin, both materially and 
ideologically. He worked with the CIA to provide arms, allied with the Pashtun Mujaheddin to 
alienate non-Pashtun and Shi’a peoples, and sponsored radical Islamist camps across several 
countries (Rostami-Povey  22).  
Because of the Mujaheddin’s donors and allies, they defeated the Soviet Union and 
secured control. Once in power, they stripped nearly all assets, privatized public services and 
goods, and pummeled the economy, drastically lowering standards of living. In urban areas, the 
majority of the population were employed by the state and spiraled into poverty once the 
Mujaheddin’s economic policies took effect. Rural areas were similarly devastated by the 
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destruction of Afghanistan’s agricultural and pastoral economy. The majority of the country was 
left to find alternative sources of incomes. Opium production presented opportunities for income 
generation, credit and cash advances, and debt accumulation. Cramer and Goodhand define the 
state of Afghanistan’s economy, created by war and displacement and sustained by opium 
production and arms smuggling, as a “regionalized” economy broken off from the national 
market (895). The emergence of a new economy disrupted long-standing social hierarchies. The 
ulama’s political influence expanded and much of the power possessed by khans, or landowners, 
was absorbed by Islamist groups and local commanders (Fielden & Goodhand 8). They 
constituted a new social strata which yielded unregulated control over profit from smuggling 
activities and abused women with impunity. Violent and overlapping power struggles between 
the country’s many regional warlords plagued Afghanistan for years with factional murder, 
violence against women, and pillaging. Thousands of poor families were indebted to warlords 
and defenseless to their ridiculous demands and subsequent punishments.  
Violence against women was not a symptom of rising conservatism as much it was rooted 
in the “corrosive interactions between poverty, insecurity, and loss of autonomy” (Kandiyoti 
194). The Mujaheddin’s reign led to a brutal civil war from 1992-1996 and finalized the 
complete collapse of Afghan state institutions. This period saw the most heinous atrocities 
committed against women in modern Afghan history.2 With the Soviet no longer involved, 
America’s complicity in the horrific developments were obvious, yet there was little mention of 
Afghanistan from the governments which helped cultivate these conditions (Donini 66).  
US support of fundamentalist insurgent groups was strategic in ensuring Afghanistan’s 
failure as a nation-state. US foreign policy during the Cold War was primarily concerned with 
subverting Soviet power at all costs. The defeat of the Soviet empire was at the expense of 
Afghanistan’s nationhood. 1.5 million deaths, a refugee crisis displacing 7 million people, 
rampant rape and thievery, the alienation of the Afghan public, and a complete economic 
collapse exacerbated the already tumultuous inner-ethnic relations and poor living conditions, 
encouraged militant activities, and fostered puritanical interpretations of Islam among the people.  
The US failed to craft a plan to rebuild Afghanistan’s infrastructure and ensure the peace and 
democracy they had promised for Afghanistan’s women and future (Rubin 96). It essentially 
                                               
2 Refer to RAWA, Amnesty International, and the Human Rights Watch human rights reports.  
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created the ideal breeding ground for the Taliban, a group which claimed it would restore order 
and moral unrighteousness through Islam. 
  
The Rise of the Taliban  
 
Several ethnic groups in rural peripheries were discontented with the Mujaheddin’s failed 
leadership and licentiousness. Young male students from madrassas, most of who were refugees 
and orphans of war who had lived their whole lives in male-segregated refugee camps in 
Pakistan, sought to dismantle the Mujaheddin and cleanse Afghan society from un-Islamic 
behavior by strictly enforcing Sharia law, disarming the population, and bringing peace to the 
people (Maley 14). They called themselves the “Taliban,” which is literally translated as “the 
students.” Indoctrinated by madrassas, a relatively modern political and fundamentalist 
interpretation of Sunni Islam, outside of Afghanistan, these young men had never known their 
native country at peace, nor were they attuned to its many ethnic complexities. Largely from 
poor, illiterate, and conservative Pashtun regions, they only knew war and the Madrassa system, 
a system which gave meaning to their lives (Rashid 128). These emotional backstories bear 
relevance to Taliban ideology and its treatment of women. Their idealized notions on how 
women should behave developed from Madrassas propagated an ideology shaped by historically 
specific and recent political events, not by Sharia law itself. Ravaged by years of war and 
starvation, the people happily and readily welcomed the Taliban, a group which established itself 
as the moral and conservative counterpart to the Mujaheddin’s sinful excesses. Backed by 
Pakistan and through the Ministry for the Enforcement of Islamic Virtue and the Prevention of 
Vice, the Taliban policed gender policies which mandated the veil, seclusion, and unemployment 
for women on the basis of religion.  
Throughout the 1990s, Afghanistan was known as “rogue state,” hopeless and outside the 
concern of the international community. Kolhatkar argues that this title is inappropriate and 
masks US sponsorship of terrorist activities, suggesting Afghanistan rather be considered a 
“destroyed state” to hold outside influence accountable (38). Attention on Afghanistan increased 
once the US government made plans to build a Unocal oil and gas pipeline running through the 
country to leverage control over the world’s oil supply. The US and Taliban relationship has 
since been inconsistent. US foreign policy favored Taliban rule to help facilitate and stabilize the 
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pipeline deal, and the Taliban in turn would profit millions of off the pipeline. The Taliban went 
from being of little concern to the US government to a priority. Towards the end of the 90s, the 
Taliban was grabbing headlines on for being “the players most capable of achieving peace in 
Afghanistan at this moment in history” (Wall Street Journal 1997). Wall Street Journal published 
the article: “Afghani Rebels Win Gains Global Notice—Nation Attracts Formal Recognition, Oil 
Firms' Interest” (1997). American concern for human rights was complicated by potential 
economic profit through collaboration with the Taliban.  
 
The Northern Alliance 
 
The narrative shifted after the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings and once the Taliban proved to be 
uncooperative with Unocal and US authority. The Taliban’s human rights abuses, which had 
existed during the pipeline negotiations, suddenly became non-negotiable. Before this point, the 
condition of women in Afghanistan and the injustices of Islamic dictatorship had not been of 
concern to the United States. Following the 9/11 attacks, the US launched Operation Enduring 
Freedom, the official name under which America wages its ‘war on terrorism.’ They unleashed 
an onslaught of military airstrikes and allied with the fundamentalist armies of the Mujaheddin 
era, collectively known as the Northern Alliance, to overthrow their shared enemy, the Taliban 
(Kolhatkar 7). Shortly after the Taliban’s fall, members of the Northern Alliance were offered 
high-ranking government positions by the US, and within months, they resumed their criminal 
acts, repressive policies, and violence against women. Anti-Taliban rhetoric was conflated with 
women’s rights as a means to justify war and the US alliance with warlord extremists, further 
degrading the status of women. The Taliban is the focal point—the physical manifestation of evil 
and barbarism— in American women’s rights discourse. Yet, local warlords were undeniably 
extremists in their own right. Under their rule, Afghans, especially women, were subjected to 
demoralizing violent antics. This leaves a glaring question—why did violence against women in 
Afghanistan only receive attention once it came from one group of extremists over another?  
Wars and foreign meddling in Afghanistan as displaced, killed, impoverished and 
intimately affected its citizen, exacerbating  economic inopportunity, environmental devastation, 
infrastructural collapse, deep-seated political corruption, criminal drug, arms, oil trade, and drone 
warfare. The purpose of mapping the rise and fall of political regimes in modern Afghan history 
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lies in puncturing the illusion that the advent of the Taliban is isolated from US government 
motives. The Taliban is engineered as the sole reason for women’s current suffering, and their 
rise to power as an overnight phenomenon unrelated to U.S. involvement in the region’s history. 
Indeed, the Taliban rose swiftly and suddenly. After years of political instability, external 
influence, and internal conflicts, it did not rise unpredictably.  
A geopolitical overview cannot grant readers a direct understanding of the constantly 
evolving gender dynamics embedded in Afghanistan’s everyday social relationships. Providing 
context on state policies and past events as the sole means to understand gender relations in 
Afghanistan is a fruitless exercise, given that the modern state’s governance apparatuses  had 
limited access and contact to the majority of its women. Scholarship on Afghanistan’s war 
economy and its social transformative properties is well developed in the field of political 
science, especially when compared to scholarship on Afghan gender relations, which ironically 
have been profoundly shaped by Afghanistan’s well-studied war economy.3 Limited fieldwork in 
and proximity to real women in Afghan communities has seen minimal developments in research 
which covers the effects of war on gender hierarchies within households and communities.  
The Taliban’s oppression of women is indisputable and abominable, yet accepting it as a 
reflection of gender relations in Afghanistan portrays a lack of understanding on how gender 
dynamics operate. I do not fill this gap, but rather document how gender politics has been 
approached against a static cultural backdrop. The moral mainstreaming of women’s rights and 
its relation to depictions of Afghan women reveal how former First Lady Laura Bush, the Office 
of Global Women’s Issues, the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council, and FMF, among others, have 
softened US’s critical role in their suffering and reinforced the unbridgeable chasms between 
“them” versus “us,” with “us” enjoying a higher position on the moral ladder.  
 
THE FEMINIST MAJORITY 
 
FMF took advantage of the globalization of women’s rights by organizing their constituencies, 
drawing in prolific members, and choosing a celebrity endorsement. Global feminist solidarity 
and displays of Afghan women’s oppression were essential in keeping their campaign alive. 
Following the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom, Smeal accepted it as a necessary means to 
                                               
3 Refer to the research of Michael Bhatia, Christopher Cramer, Jonathan Goodhand, Adam Pain, and Jo Grace as 
examples of scholarship  on Afghanistan’s war economy.  
19 
bolster women’s rights. She conflates FMF and the Bush Administration’s goals and intentions 
under a collective “we” as she announces, “Now, as we seek to remove this terrorist regime that 
has wreaked havoc, we must return women to their rightful place in society. We must establish a 
broad-based constitutional democracy that restores women’s suffrage and insists that women be 
leaders and participants in that government” (Feminist Daily Newswire 2001b). Smeal delivered 
a congressional testimony shortly after 9/11, stating that FMF has seen an outpouring of support 
from Americans outraged at the Taliban’s brutal treatment of women and refers several times to 
their recorded public humiliation. “With the nation’s focus on Afghanistan,” she notes, there is 
“increased visibility about the plight of Afghan women.” Smeal finishes with a strong statement: 
“Afghan women must be freed,” and it is up to America to restore their rights (Feminist Daily 
Newswire 2001a). Specifically, it is up to the Administration, which could “salvage the future of 
Afghanistan, the rights of Afghan women, and its own scorecard grade” (Feminist Daily 
Newswire 2003). This implies that without American attention, Afghan women cannot be freed. 
Without America, Afghan women have no hope. The effort, autonomy, and risks taken by 
Afghan women and Afghan-based organizations and movements are effectively ignored and 
belittled under the all-consuming gaze of the US. Regardless of well-meaning intentions. FMF 
defined the feminist struggle through unchallenged binary constructions of Afghan women as 
victims and American women as their only hope, with the Taliban being their shared, single 
enemy. 
The Taliban is mentioned in almost every single “Feminist Newswire” article on FMF’s 
blog. Its purpose is to enforce the “lowest imaginable standard of living for the Afghan people” 
and to destroy “the advances we hope the world will invest in” (Feminist Daily Newswire 2012). 
While FMF has briefly acknowledged US foreign policy during the Cold War as a “tragic 
mistake” and certainly provides more transparency in the region’s history, it still underscores the 
extent of damage women have disproportionately suffered at the hand of external influences and 
US-backed entities outside of the Taliban (Feminist Daily Newswire 2001a). FMF continued 
their support of the US government under the Obama administration, assuring the people that 
they support “President Obama's decision to delay the drawdown of U.S. troops from 
Afghanistan.” Smeal contends that “the U.S., NATO, and the world have a moral obligation to 
stand with [Afghan] women,” yet does not expand beyond an obligation to provide “an 
opportunity for Afghan security forces to strengthen their ability to defeat the Taliban” (Feminist 
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Daily Newswire 2015). Perhaps the mention of “moral obligation” would hold if it did not refer 
to an abstract, general obligation based on universal human rights, but were tied to specific 
political occurrences of American economic exploitations and direct contribution to rampant 
warlordism in Afghanistan.  Smeal stated in an FMF press release that, “once the Taliban 
forbade women from working and going outside their homes, the country’s medical and 
educational systems collapsed” (Feminist Daily Newswire 2001b). As explained in previous 
sections, the eventual collapse of state institutions in Afghanistan were set in motion long before 
the Taliban due to a long history of foreign subsidies, orchestrated ethnic division, and 
warlordism.  
The core principle of feminism is the protection of the women’s rights. FMF’s mission is 
to “advance women's equality, non-violence, economic development, and, most importantly, 
empowerment of women and girls in all sectors of society.”4 Non-violence directly contradicts 
with its support of US war propaganda and military intervention. Its vision of advancing 
women’s equality and empowerment is complicated by its re-affirmation of US’s role in 
implementing women’s liberation in Afghanistan and the universal feminist framework it 
advocates within. It uncritically accepts US imperial motives and Western feminist hegemonic 
interests at the expense of its feminist principles. In critiquing FMF’s Campaign to end gender 
apartheid, my thesis determines the ways in which it is embedded in the very politics it was 
formed to challenge. My aim is not to downplay the instances in which it has stood against real 
perpetrators of Afghan women’s suffering or held its own government accountable, nor to 
suggest that transnational feminist intervention is inherently problematic. FMF played an 
essential role in stopping the construction of the US-backed UNOCAL oil and gas pipeline, a 
pipeline which would have in dubiously funneled millions of dollars in profit to the Taliban 
(Feminist Daily Newswire 2001a). Its past efforts makes its support of NATO and contradictory 
politics even more regrettable. Rather than standing against both the Taliban and the Northern 
Alliance, both of which are interconnected and detrimental to women’s empowerment, FMF 
aligns itself with the US and commends its humanitarian aid— even though it is the very entity 
which has uprooted infrastructure and bombed civilians (Feminist Daily Newswire 2001a; 
2001b).  
                                               
4  The campaign’s mission and published work can be accessed on their website: 
http://www.feminist.org/afghan/index.asp 
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Afghan women have been a concern for FMF long before 9/11, however it was not until 
the terrorist attacks that the Bush administration started working closely with them to, as Mrs. 
Bush famously put it, “kick off a world-wide effort to focus on the brutality against women and 
children by....the Taliban” (2001). By perpetuating a simplified story of the abuse of women by 
the Taliban, with the burqa serving as its most public symbol, FMF joined the US government in 
projecting one route for liberation: topple the Taliban and abolish mandatory veiling, then 
women would be free. A brutal war which killed, starved, and displaced thousands of women 
indeed toppled the Taliban regime and their laws on veiling, yet the current situation in 
Afghanistan is far from the liberation the US promised.5  
My thesis does not claim that FMF rhetoric neatly coincides with US foreign policy. It is 
important to recognize that FMF and the Bush administration's rhetoric do not always match, and 
in certain instances, directly conflict. FMF continues to address the grave inequalities women 
suffer long after the US invasion, yet in as early as 2002, former President Bush stated, “The last 
time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their 
own homes, forbidden from working or going to school. Today women are free” (2002). After 
Laura Bush’s visit to Kabul in 2005, she commended Afghanistan for the “power of freedom...on 
display” and the work of US soldiers: “thanks to you, millions of little girls are going to school 
in this country” (2004). Bush’s six hour visit to Kabul excludes the vast majority of rural 
women’s experience following the fall of the Taliban and exclusively credits the US military for 
all of Afghanistan’s supposed progress. Paula Dobriansky UAWC’s co-chair, similarly reiterates 
the newfound freedom of women (in Kabul) after the Taliban in “Ask the White House” 
segment, despite rampant warlordism, especially in communities outside of Kabul, showing 
otherwise (2005). FMF does speak on Afghanistan’s progress, but does not fabricate the same 
rosy image of women freed by US soldiers.   
 
The Revolutionary Association of Women in Afghanistan 
 
FMF will be compared to its adversary, the Revolutionary Association of Women in Afghanistan 
(RAWA), which leans much further toward the “feminism-as-imperialism” end of the discourse 
                                               
5 Refer to Marc Herold’s “A dossier on civilian victims of United States' aerial bombing of Afghanistan” for 
statistics on US bombs and their effects on civilian livelihood.  
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on transnational feminism. I use the term adversary to refer to RAWA’s consistent and adamant 
denunciation of the Northern Alliance’s imperialist motives and FMF’s political alignments. 
RAWA is not FMF’s adverse in the sense that the two are unaffiliated. FMF responded to local 
documentation of Afghan women by RAWA long before the 9/11 attacks and largely built its 
campaign off it. Formed in 1977 by Meena Keshwar Kamal, RAWA developed out of modern, 
urban and secular settings and largely centered their work on women in refugee camps in 
Pakistan, RAWA’s authority is complicated by the intersecting levels of class, education, ethnic 
and tribal linkages, and a rural and urban dichotomy within Afghanistan. These combined factors 
affect how fundamentalist rule is perceived by women and RAWA’s reach to more rural 
communities. RAWA mobilized and worked with rebellion groups who constituted the 
Mujaheddin to combat Soviet occupation forces. The unprecedented levels of self-determination, 
political resistance, and civic engagement Afghan women yielded at this time, however, was 
largely ignored by the outside world and threatened by the US-funded, male-dominated 
extremism of the Mujaheddin (Farrell & McDermott 40). Awareness of an active political and 
social movement led by women for women did not coincide with Western narratives of 
victimization. Their efforts, though laudable, were appropriated by a broader, political agenda. 
Unfortunately, this was the case in the wake of 9/11 as well. 
Though RAWA has been consistent in its efforts to maintain autonomy from global 
actors, its need for large-scale funding and political influence to build and maintain localized 
structures, particularly in gender-segregated refugee camps, lead them to collaborate with global 
institutions, NGOs, and feminists. As mentioned, transnational feminist alliances have become 
popular forms of human rights advocacy, and spread across the scalar levels of the global and 
local. RAWA’s strategically organized within these human rights conventions by documenting 
and publicizing local abuses as an appeal to Western audiences. RAWA’s representations 
directly disseminated through popular media as a means of generating international outrage 
which draws support and resources from state donors, human rights advocate organizations, and 
transnational feminists for RAWA’s cause. Their strategy is contradictory in nature as it 
challenges yet functions within a modern framework of transnational human rights advocacy.   
RAWA has been self-aware of how their activism affects different audiences. The 
documentation geared towards external audiences which victimizes women and highlights the 
atrocities they endure is drastically different than their domestic activism. Payam-e Zan, a 
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quarterly magazine published in Dari and Pashtu since 1981, for example, is intended for Afghan 
women themselves, not the international community. It displays themes of self-empowerment, 
self-interpretation, and inspiration through poetry, local projects, and accounts of progression 
(Brodsky 80-81). Despite its presence in the global sphere, RAWA’s legitimacy and impact rests 
on its credibility to function as an autonomous, local authority authentically representing Afghan 
women’s realities. 
Compelling and horrific evidence of violence committed against women indeed garnered 
widespread support and funding by US-based entities, but only after 9/11. FMF often cites the 
footage, without citing RAWA by name, as evidence of women’s suffering under the Taliban’s 
decrees “banning women from employment, from attending school, from leaving their homes 
without a close male relative and without wearing the head-to-toe burqa shroud” (Feminist Daily 
Newswire 2001a). Women’s subjection to rape, forced marriages, mandatory veiling, and cruel 
and unusual punishment was documented by RAWA long before the Taliban came to power. 
RAWA and UN reports show that Mujaheddin’s rule was among the most violent, repressive 
periods of time for women, yet it received little attention and aid both from the US government 
and transnational feminist organizations (Farrell & McDermott 40). It is RAWA’s condemnation 
of the Taliban and raw footage of abuses suffered by women at their hands which was exploited 
as a just reason for war. As Farrell and McDermott note, RAWA’s “legitimating power of the 
authenticating representations….are available to service a myriad of interventions…by the 
interests of the subject population” (35).  
Despite RAWA’s sudden popularity, it maintained its strong stance against both the 
Taliban and the Northern Alliance, and emphasized long-term solutions for gender equity. To 
mold RAWA’s credible representations into a watered-down dichotomy complementary to US 
interests, RAWA’s criticism of the Northern Alliance was overlooked by mass media and the 
Administration and their activism drowned out by transnational organizations such as FMF, 
leaving the Taliban as the sole enemy. 
Both FMF and RAWA, thus, have operated within the conventions of human rights 
advocacy and feminist discourses, with the former serving as the authentic local agent and the 
latter serving as the largely Western “rescuing” entity. In order for the international community 
to amplify the abuses of women, FMF relied on local agents like RAWA to produce authentic 
evidence of their victimization. Yet, aside from an invitation to a 2000 conference, FMF has 
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rarely supported or given mention to RAWA. This is important to note because FMF often prides 
itself on being the “first to sound the alarm... on the horrific treatment of women under the 
Taliban” (Feminist Daily Newswire 2001b). Several of its articles carry a self-congratulatory 
tone which leaves little space to acknowledge the local activism and movements led by Afghan 
women risking their lives for their rights. In response to FMF-owned Ms. Magazine’s article 
called “A Coalition of Hope,” a scathing open letter was published critiquing FMF for 
suggesting they have “single-handedly freed the women of Afghanistan from an oppression that 
started and ended with the Taliban,” simultaneously excluding independent Afghan activists and 
organizations as legitimate humanitarian and political influencers. The letter goes on to note 
FMF’s failure to mention in the violence against women before the Taliban under the US-backed 
Mujaheddin and public leaders. The chief point I would like to draw on does not come until later 
in the article when the author exposes the hegemonic, Western feminism of FMF which assumes 
ownership of feminism and excludes Third World women: “in carving out their version of reality 
they not only fail to give any credit to RAWA and others but they also claim to represent some 
sort of feminist majority” (Miller 2002).  
The problematic nature of the representations of women of color by White feminists has 
been challenged. The notion of “global feminism” inspires visions of solidarity and implies a 
sharing of power, yet is highly susceptible to consuming independent local feminisms and 
overriding their autonomy. Once representations transcend borders and are interpolated into the 
international feminist arena, they are coincidentally entangled in a web of global power systems, 
foreign policies, and imperial agendas. Thus, the representations of Afghan women, even 
representations with feminist origins, must be critiqued as a potential extension of state interests 
because it is all too often that the “work of advocacy…[is] never ‘just’ advocacy, neither in the 
sense of ‘just’ as simple nor in the sense of ‘just’ as fair” (Farrell & McDermott 36). The 
hegemony of feminist groups such as FMF, Inderpal Grewal contends “affects women’s lives 
and women’s groups worldwide by their interests and their policies” (518). My arguments 
critique representations of oppressed Afghan women which undermine their autonomy, 
misconstrue their identities, and are co-opted by Western war propaganda. It does not generalize 
all representations of oppressed Afghan women as wholly problematic. Authentic representations 
of victims of abuse have the potential to bring voice to oppressed groups, raise awareness, solicit 
funding from influential global actors, and result in positive change. It is critical these 
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representations (1) come from the victims themselves and (2) their circulation maintains a 
transparent, feminist intention which does not belittle individual autonomy. RAWA depictions of 
Afghan women meet these criteria, yet FMF’s circulation of its depictions does not. Both, 
however, have been manipulated to legitimate the interests of US foreign policy which 
undermine and contradict their own feminist politics. Regardless of their feminist imperative and 
authenticity, representations circulated by organizations such as FMF function within political 
and economically-driven global systems of domination supportive of military intervention, 
economic exploitation, and a homogenous, “majority” feminism monitored and owned by the 
West. 
 
CONSTRUCTING AFGHAN IDENTITY THROUGH WESTERN EYES  
 
On March 28, 2002, April W. Palmerlee, former Senior Coordinator for the Office of 
International Women’s Issues, delivered a speech titled “The Situation of Women in 
Afghanistan.” The Office of International Women’s Issues, the main body for coordinating U.S. 
foreign policy on issues of concern to women, functions to “help implement practical steps to 
improve the status of women” (2002). The findings drawn from Palmerlee’s address are an 
appropriate starting point reflective of the common trends seen across depictions of Afghan 
women. I found four main concerns with Palmerlee’s speech worth addressing: (1) it defines 
American nationalism and idealized citizenship in association to rescuing Afghan women from 
their conditions, (2) it equates freedom and liberation to trivial Western consumer products such 
as miniskirts and high heels, (3) its references to pre-Taliban Afghanistan idealizes the past and 
misrepresents the realities of most Afghan women, (4) and it presents the Taliban as the sole 
reason for women’s current suffering and the rise of Taliban as an overnight phenomenon, which 
erases U.S. involvement in the region’s history. I hone in on the combination of these factors for 
two reasons: (1) they neatly construct a sort of American-led rescue mission—an attractive, 
convincing emotional and ethical appeal for continued military intervention in Afghanistan, and 
(2) I found them to be prevalent trends in several sources I have examined across global and 
national capacities. Therefore, I will structure my arguments thematically and incorporate a 
number of external sources where deemed relevant. 
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Gendered Nationalism 
 
Palmerlee’s appearance was sponsored by the League of Women Voters, an organization, 
founded in feminist ideals, which encourages civic engagement and activism. Thus, this 
particular speech is tailored to and largely consumed by American women voters concerned with 
the status of women. This is evident in Palmerlee’s feminist framing of American national 
identity. Her speech premises with an appeal to everyday American women on the basis of their 
womanhood and national identity. She defines what it means to be an American woman and the 
duties it entails. One of the most important roles of an American woman is being a “responsible 
citizen,” someone who takes an active interest in the “wellbeing of her community, her society, 
her family, and her government.” Showing concern with those less fortunate “half a world 
away,” Palmerlee stresses, indicates that individual contribution towards the advancement of 
your own nation and government. Before proceeding to speak on the situation of women in 
Afghanistan, she first characterizes the average American woman’s moral obligations to less 
privileged women in distant lands; a characterization which is attached to nationalistic sentiment 
and idealized citizenship. Directing attention towards the atrocities faced by Afghan women was 
not simply the moral thing to do after 9/11, it was the American thing to do. Fulfilling gendered 
notions of ideal citizenship depends on their continued support of US military intervention. 
Outrageous military spending and recorded civilian casualties lose their meaning when buried 
under ideological pandering brimming with romanticized sentiments of patriotism and liberation.  
I will refer to this as “gendered nationalism,” a concept that is prevalent in discourses that 
link military intervention to feminist solidarity. Gendered nationalism effectively unites women 
across political ideologies and feminist identity under the umbrella of universal human rights and 
frames the situation of Afghan women as a feminist rescue mission. The Bush administration has 
found success in collaborating with well-established feminist organizations to rally widespread 
support of US military intervention in Afghanistan in the name of women’s rights. Namely, it 
has worked with the aforementioned FMF’s rhetoric certainly overlaps with Palmerlee and the 
US government. Appeals to citizenship are evident in a 2002 article on their website, which 
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condemns a lack of US funding to Afghanistan and urges several Western women’s 
organizations to protest. Smeal asks her audience, “where has the American spirit gone?” 
(Feminist Daily NewsWire 2002). In a congressional testimony, she echoes similar sentiments: 
“we as Americans do feel a moral obligation to Afghanistan…we can be the greatest generation 
today… [if we] strive for the dream of democracy and human rights for all…we cannot forget 
the women” (Feminist Daily NewsWire 2001a). Similar to Palmerlee, Smeal feeds the same 
gendered nationalist emotional appeals, all under the premise of universal human rights as 
women’s rights, to a largely female audience. To be the “greatest generation,” to exhibit the very 
essence of being an American, means to be supportive of increased involvement in Afghanistan. 
Embedded in free-market capitalism, gendered nationalism approaches Afghan women’s 
liberation not by freedom, but by the freedom to consume. 
 
The Freedom to Consume 
 
Before mentioning education or healthcare, Palmerlee devotes a paragraph to listing trivial 
markers of Western femininity and lifestyle which Afghan women lack: “makeup, nail polish, or 
jewelry...colorful or stylish clothing, sheer stockings…or high heels.” That is not to say that she 
ignored the very real issues faced by Afghan women, such as illiteracy and inaccessibility to 
healthcare. Yet, these issues are discussed later as a preface to how the United States’ defeat of 
the Taliban and the millions of dollars in aid has improved these conditions and established the 
US as the “most generous contributors to humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.” Once again, 
Palmerlee draws on gendered nationalism by highlighting Western cultural identifiers, which are 
simultaneously identifiers of capitalism, and America’s alleged humanitarianism.  
It is worth noting that each item listed refers to the physical appearance of women. 
Miniskirts, or more generally, popular Western clothing which abide by specific cultural beauty 
standards, are equated to freedom. Conversely, burqas, and Islamic standards of feminine 
modesty and respectability, are equated to a lack thereof. At their core, both of these standards 
essentially measure the status of women in accordance to their clothing and physical appearance. 
Women across geographical locations and cultures are disproportionately burdened to abide by a 
socially acceptable dress code. Of course, though Western women may be socially sanctioned for 
breaking this code, their dress code is not regulated by law in the way that Afghan women’s were 
28 
under the Taliban. It still stands that measuring how liberated a society is by how covered or 
exposed its women are is dependent on cultural interpretation and has no credibility in the actual 
social, political, and economic agency women exercise within their respective communities.  
Even more important to note is that nail polish, miniskirts, high heels and the like are all 
consumer products readily accessible to those who can afford them. Within the United States 
itself, many women of lower class status cannot easily indulge in “stylish clothing” and jewelry. 
Are they, along with Afghan women, lacking freedom? To be transparent, freedom in this 
context suggests the freedom to be a consumer in a market-driven society. It is tailored to 
Western economic values and does not organically fit within the communal structure of Afghan 
society, nor does it advocate for access to public utilities. 
Palmerlee is joined by fellow high-ranking government official Karen Hughes, a close 
advisor to former President Bush, in the State’s publicity tour on the liberation of Afghan 
women. Once the Taliban was successfully defeated, the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council 
(UAWC), headed by former Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs, Paula 
Dobriansky, and Afghan Minister of Women’s Affairs, Habiba Sarabi, was formed to “promote 
private/public partnerships between U.S. and Afghan institutions and mobilize private resources 
to ensure Afghan women gain the skills and education deprived them under years of Taliban 
misrule” (G. Bush & Karzai 2002).  
UAWC limited itself to discussing overt, non-controversial issues including low literacy 
rates, poor healthcare, and mandatory veiling—all under the Taliban’s tyrannical thumb. It does 
not mention how rampant, US-propagated warlordism created these conditions. It does, however, 
attribute women’s issues to their non-contribution to the market economy. In a highly publicized 
affair, UAWC received a $2.5 million grant from the State Department to build “Women’s 
Resource Centers,” which is measly in comparison to the costs of war fighting and military 
infrastructure. UAWC’s external funding is framed as a means for women’s economic and social 
advancement, with the Centers being advertised as a “one-stop shopping” market (Ponticelli 
2004).  
Former Senior Coordinator for International Women's Issues at the U.S. Department of 
State, Charlotte Ponticelli, prescribed a “free-market capitalist approach to assisting Afghan 
women“ in a 2004 interview with World Vision Radio: “Connie Duckworth [is]...a very 
powerful woman in business...she visited Afghanistan...and she saw what the women were 
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capable of doing. For example weaving rugs—she said: ‘You know—there’d be a tremendous 
market for this in the U.S.” At the expense of Afghan women interpreting their freedoms through 
local social frameworks, i.e. their tribal identities, faith, and familial structures which are deeply-
embedded in their day-to-day lives, their freedom is constructed as attainable if they manage to 
function and consume within the U.S.-led global market economy. The economic politics of the 
GOP in particular favor neoliberalism and privatization. It is not off brand, then, for the Bush 
administration to construe freedom according to material possession and the individual ability to 
contribute to consumerism.  
UAWC’s factsheet, “U.S. Commitment to Afghan Women: The U.S.-Afghan Women’s 
Council,” published in 2004, provides information on their budget and philanthropic work. The 
numbers, minuscule in comparison to US military spending in Afghanistan, are deficient 
considering the damage after years of war and US bombing and do not sustain direct assistance 
nor the long-term change UAWC promises. Its purpose lies in its marketability. An “effective 
public relations tool for the U.S. government’s ‘liberation’ of women,” UAWC’s feminist veneer 
and rhetoric showcases the State’s commitment to women’s rights (Kolhatkar 178). 
 
The ‘Overnight’ Enemy 
 
In her 2002 address, Palmerlee asks her audience to imagine a world which took that away from 
Americans in an attempt to try to explain the effects of the Taliban on women’s freedom, 
insinuating that Western culture can be defined by “wearing makeup, nail polish…high heels.” 
Similarly, photos of Afghan women before the Taliban adorned in miniskirts and high heels have 
dominated political debate on the status of women, and were later viewed by President Trump as 
a cause for continued American troops in Afghanistan. Photos of this nature reveal that before 
the Taliban, Afghan women once enjoyed freedom. Women’s liberation is measured by the 
length of their skirts. The varying miniskirts of the past, a drastic difference from the floor-length 
burqas of today, seem to confirm a downward trajectory of women’s consumer rights that neatly 
coincides with American capitalist interpretations of women’s rights. It is a persuasive, albeit 
irresponsible, tactic to attribute Afghan women’s lack of freedom to a lack of miniskirts on the 
streets of Kabul. Afghan women, so culturally unfamiliar and alien, become a source of pity, less 
so because of the years of war, hunger, and family death they have endured and more so because 
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they cannot wear “makeup, nail polish, or jewelry.” Focusing on the cultural over the historical 
obscures the development of repressive regimes and Western interference in the region, in turn 
obscuring the core issues and nature of women's suffering in Afghanistan.  
The Taliban itself is constructed as isolated from history. “The Taliban,” Palmerlee 
ensures “changed everything.” She appeals to her American audience by quoting a journalist 
who stated “imagine waking up and discovering that overnight Congress had outlawed 
television, movies, videogames….cigarettes and alcohol…” In addition to referencing capitalistic 
markers of Western lifestyle a second time, she suggests that the Taliban is the sole enemy to 
blame for women’s current misfortune and their rise to power was an overnight phenomenon. 
The same day Laura Bush delivered her address, Hughes launched a publicity tour on behalf of 
Afghan women by exploiting their plight to “highlight the cruel nature of the people [the 
Taliban] we were up against” and ultimately justify war (Goodman 2004). The US Department 
of State released “The Taliban’s War Against Women,” which began in the same fashion as 
Palmerlee’s speech: “Prior to the rise of the Taliban, women in Afghanistan were protected 
under law and increasingly afforded rights in Afghan society” (2001). Prior to the Taliban, 
Afghanistan was fighting a civil war and suffering through a different extremist group, the 
Mujaheddin. It was not until twenty years before which Afghan women had more freedom, albeit 
their freedom was limited by their class, social status, and geographical location. Presenting the 
plight of Afghan women as “half a world away” disconnects their suffering from the US, hiding 
the ways in which it has benefitted from its involvement in Afghanistan. Afghan women suffer 
under Taliban’s regime and their law-enforced dress code, but not exclusively. The US-backed 
Mujaheddin, coupled with Soviet warfare, has revealed that women’s suffering existed before 
and beyond the Taliban.  
 
Afghanistan’s “Golden Age:” The Mini Skirt Phenomenon 
 
Palmerlee glorifies Afghanistan pre-Taliban early on in her speech, stating that women used to 
be “active participants in society” who were doctors, lawyers, engineers, and integral to the 
success of Afghanistan’s economy during the long years of war. As I sifted through various 
public texts and images from 2001 to present day, I found a common trend in which several 
government officials, feminists and public leaders reminisced on Afghanistan’s past, 
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representing pre-Taliban Afghanistan as a liberated nation which granted women free movement 
within their communities. FMF’s Smeal similarly spoke on women’s “history of public service 
leadership…in Kabul, before the Taliban took over” since the 1950s (Feminist Daily Newswire 
2001a). References to Afghanistan’s so-called “Golden Age” (1930s-1979) necessitates a close 
analysis due to its pervasiveness in official government discourse and the ways in which it has 
been rhetorically utilized to emotionally manipulate targeted audiences.  
There are several factors I would like to mention in regards to American portrayal of 
Afghanistan’s “Golden Age,” its intention, and its effects. First, I note the importance of 
reminding audiences that oppression is not an innate, nor static cultural identifier of Afghan 
women. Moreover, I do not disagree with Palmerlee and Smeal’s assertion that there were 
Afghan women who held respectable employment positions before the Taliban. However, the 
implication that Afghan women as a whole were highly educated and economically dependent 
misrepresents the overall state of Afghanistan at this time. In reality, only a small, urban elite of 
middle class women in Kabul in favor of King Shah’s politics could relate to these 
representations. The rest of the country was struggling and impoverished. The 1978 Revolution 
and the coup in 1979 effectively ended Afghanistan’s “Golden Age,” and revealed that its 
prosperity did not reach an overwhelming majority of citizens, especially rural communities 
which compromised about 85% of the population in 1979. 82% percent of the population was 
illiterate, the average life expectancy was slightly above 40, and college education were not 
attainable to the average Afghan woman (The World Bank 2014). When Afghanistan’s supposed 
past success is considered a valid reason for American intervention, it is crucial to ask how 
success is defined and who it refers to. Whether Afghanistan was on route to democracy or not 
does not negate from the fact that before the 1979 coup, it was largely plagued by poverty and 
most women did not have the freedom that Palmerlee and Smeal suggest. 
The language and rhetorical devices utilized by the Bush administration, and uncritically 
accepted by the FMF to illustrate Afghan women in need of liberations by militarism has been 
widely critiqued in scholarship on the “War on Terror.” However given shift 
The nature of these photos is dependent on which sources are circulating it. To Afghan 
citizens, these photos may be a hopeful reminder of a time when their nation was not plagued by 
constant war and tremendous political instability. It may be a source of pride and optimism for 
what they want their country to be in the future. Mohammad Qayoumi refers to these 
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photographs as a reminder that “disorder, terrorism, and violence against schools that educate 
girls are not inevitable” (2010). More than a nostalgic trip down memory lane, these photographs 
symbolize that Afghanistan can move on from the ravages of war; violence is not an inevitable 
constant. My focus is on the circulation of these photos by Western sources and how it has 
largely been interpreted by American audiences.  
Adorned in miniskirts as they strut in high heels with manicured nails and makeup 
outlining their eyes, these women could easily pass as American women. 6 The women 
protagonists at the center of the image symbolize not just what Afghanistan was, but what it 
could be again. My previous analysis of the capitalistic framework which the US functions 
within their advocacy for Afghan women bears relevance given the women’s stylish miniskirts 
and heels, female-geared consumer products tied to the Western-led global fashion market. The 
black-and-white photo, evidence of its age, has the words “Antes do Taliban,” which translates 
to “before the Taliban,” displayed next to the women. In its presentation to Americans, these 
photos show that Afghanistan was on the path towards democracy and Westernization. It shows 
that Afghanistan is capable of civilization.  
Women’s rights discourse in war rhetoric was mainstream, arguable over-saturated, in the 
years following 9/11. The Trump administration was meant, at least in the public eye, to signify 
a shift away from US military-backed nation-building and women advancement in foreign, war-
torn countries. Idealizing the past and asserting the need to return to its apparent glory 
successfully rallied a large group of Americans to support and rationalize Trump’s platform and 
ideology during his 2016 presidential campaign. “Make America Great Again” is a sentiment 
that Trump’s team was able to mobilize around, as it created a fantastical version of the past that 
distracted from the systemic causes of today’s issues. It is not unpredictable, therefore, that 
Trump employs a similar logic to reason a prolonged military presence in Afghanistan, nor is 
unpredictable that this logic does so well to emotionally appeal to American audiences.  
Shams aptly calls this the “weaponization of nostalgia” in his article critiquing Trump’s 
ill-informed decision, and notes its common use across geographical location and time (2017). 
Indeed, utilizing photos of women from the past, particularly women in miniskirts, to muster 
support for American wars is not limited to Afghanistan and has become a predictable method of 
                                               
6 For reference, the photograph can be viewed through this link: https://ajammc.com/2017/09/06/weaponization-
nostalgia-afghan-miniskirts/ 
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showing what Islamic countries could have been had it not been for religious extremism. 
Photographs of Iranian women wearing miniskirts prior to the Islamic Revolution next to 
pictures of women donning the chador, a veil especially popular in Iran which covers everything 
but the face, were widely circulated after the Revolution to show what freedom looks like next to 
captivity. The former pictures were taken in 1979, at a time when less than 1% of Iranian women 
had access to higher education compared to the 55% attending university today. The glamour of 
miniskirts and clubs might have been the reality for a small elite in Tehran, but the vast rural 
communities could not relate. In Iraq, popular photographs of women from the 70s, before the 
Hussein regime, Persian-Gulf wars, economic sanctions, and US invasion, walking in their 
miniskirts on the streets of a thriving Baghdad distort history  of a country largely comprised of 
rural communities under the control of the Ba’ath regime, a party known for its brutal repression 
of Iraq’s majority religion, Shi’a Muslims (Shams 2017). The glamour of miniskirts masks 
sobering statistics on women’s education, employment, and access to healthcare during this time. 
Pitting these images side-by-side, in a before-and-after fashion, figuratively and literally 
illustrates a clashing tension. 
Constructing an imaginary “Golden Age” Afghanistan while simultaneously simplifying 
the various lived experiences of Afghan women before the Taliban suggests that Afghanistan’s 
return to its alleged previous state will be judged by the clothing of its women. This has not been 
harmless. An infatuation with the mini skirt versus the burqa erasing the historical, complex web 
of tangible and social inequalities experienced by Afghan women, making it difficult to 
understand how and why the present inequalities exist. Behind the glamorized shield of morality 
the US government, regardless of administration, has wielded in their warmongering campaigns, 
bares the entangled threads of systemic resource extortion, ideological manipulation, and the 
centuries-old tactic of creating the threatening, yet pitied “Other.” 
 
THE POLITICS OF THE BURQA 
 
The discussed images and Palmerlee’s press release gave legitimacy to the notion that burqa-free 
Afghanistan was the liberated Afghanistan, and it is possible to return to it once the taint of the 
Taliban has been extinguished. The burqa is associated with the Taliban’s oppressive ideology, 
yet women did not shed their burqas for miniskirts once the Taliban was overthrown. 
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Widespread among communities long before the Taliban, the burqa is one of several cultural 
forms of veiling in the region and varies according to social status and class. A regional 
conservative tradition especially predominate in rural areas, it ensures women’s modesty, 
security, and respectability.7 Long after the Taliban, women continue to wear the burqa for many 
of the same reasons. Taking of the veil could indeed be a liberating act for Afghan women; it 
could also be an act which negatively affects their modesty, safety, and sense of self in relation 
to their communal environment. Within the constraints of my thesis, I focus rather on US-led 
depictions of the burqa.   
As part of its self-awareness campaign, FMF sold swatches of mesh cloth, similar to the 
cloth covering burqa-clad women’s eyes, accompanied with a postcard saying, "wear a symbol 
of remembrance for Afghan women." The purpose of the cloth is to represent “the obstructed 
view of the world for an entire nation of women who were once free” (Feminist Daily Newswire 
1998). Interestingly, 50% of all the proceeds went towards further promoting FMF. FMF 
sensationalized the abuse women suffered by exploiting the burqa’s shock value and using mesh 
eyepieces as props in their publicity campaign. The postcard itself raises several questions. Why 
should people wear a “symbol of remembrance” for Afghan women? “Remembrance” implies 
that they are suddenly gone, as if they are paying tribute to the dead. Donning a burqa is equated 
with a lack of being.  It is contrasted with a time when women were once bare-faced and free, 
which idealizes pre-Taliban Afghanistan and assumes freedom and the burqa are mutually 
exclusive. Framing the burqa, a traditional garb, as an extension of Taliban ideology reduces its 
dynamic nature, origin, and cultural meaning into a symbol of women’s oppression. Everything 
that is backwards and oppressive in Afghanistan, regardless of its complexity, is collapsed into a 
“visual object of horror-filled fascination” (Kolhatkar 178).  
 
THE “CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” THROUGH SELECTIVE IMAGERY 
 
The “clash of civilizations,” a term popularized in the 1990s by Samuel Huntington, refers to the 
notion that the West is perpetually in conflict with the East as the “Other,” with the “Other” 
formed in negation to the self (1996). What civilization, progression, and superiority is to the 
West, barbarism, regression, and inferiority is to the East. The “clash of civilizations” sentiment 
                                               
7 Refer to Hanna Papanek anthropological description of the veil as “portable seclusion.”  
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was seen consistently throughout colonial history and has been used to justify colonial 
occupation. Yet, understanding this term as an outdated sentiment erases the ways it has been 
reshaped in modern war contexts, particular in US imperial rhetoric. In the Afghanistan, veiled 
women are the focal symbol of the Muslim world’s cultural alienness and the most common 
reference in Western political and media discourse.  
Pro-war rhetoric, characterized by the Western feminism-as-humanitarian idea of going 
to war for women and the “clash of civilizations,” is best reflected in the image of the burqa-clad 
Afghan woman. Imagery has effectively amplified verbal political discourse representing the 
situation of Afghan women in the early 2000s amidst the US invasion of Afghanistan and after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. My analysis dissects imagery across sources of varying capacities and 
functions in accordance to the concept of metonymy: “the reduction of complex situations into 
simpler visual abstractions” (Cloud 289). Ideological manipulation in politicized imagery 
construct paradigmatic oppositions by forging tension between the viewer’s sense of self and a 
disidentification with the “Other.” American identity formation is shaped by its foil. Images 
heavily circulated amidst the “War on Terror” are manipulated to strengthen US identity by 
victimizing Afghan women. Imagery, subject to appropriation by powerful agents, is well suited 
for war rhetoric and overriding critical and rational response to state action. 
In the wake of 9/11, images of Muslims, particularly Afghan women shrouded in the 
burqa, proliferated in academia, literature, mass-market commercial publishing, television, and 
printed and digital media. FMF’s website shows a sea of colored burqas and a man beating a 
burqa-clad woman in front of a young boy under the “The Taliban & Women” tab, while 
pictures of women showing their faces in a protest under the “about the Campaign tab.” Due to 
the campaign’s efforts, the burqa is linked to abuse, misogyny, and the Taliban. Removing it is 
likened to increased female political engagement. 
The infatuation with women tearing off their burqas feed into liberal fantasies of 
unveiling and has manifested itself into imagery seen across both popular and academic 
published work. Several images of Afghan women are accompanied by a variation of the word 
“veil.” Its paradox— “unveil,” is used perhaps even more frequently. The US-funded 
documentary chose the title, “Afghanistan Unveiled” to depict the aftermath of the 2001 US 
invasion; Time magazine published a photo series called “Kabul Unveiled” and featured a bare-
faced woman in their 2001 issue next to the bolded words: “Lifting the Veil: The Shocking Story 
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of How the Taliban Brutalized the Women of Afghanistan.”8 Beyond a play on words, the notion 
of unveiling a woman becomes a symbolic act of individual liberation and a “well-
choreographed ceremony,” encapsulated into a single image (Abu-Lughod 33). 
A particular strategy of metonymy relevant to images of Afghan men is the “individuated 
aggregate … a trope whereby the population as a whole is represented solely by specific 
individuals” (Lucaites & Hariman 38). Images of helpless Afghan women cannot serve their 
purpose without a foil: Afghan men. Snapshots of Arab and Afghan men, used interchangeably, 
carrying weapons and staring menacingly into the audience’s gaze entraps them into the terrorist 
persona. 
Depictions of Afghan women as obedient prisoners are constructed in the shadow of 
Afghan men as their brutal capturers. Aggression and violence is frozen onto their faces and 
expressed through their body posture; yet, these images cannot encapsulate the years of war, 
ethnic division, failed reforms, poverty, and isolation which have caused men to take up arms. 
Nor can it reveal the global superpowers, which includes the US, who funded their weapons. 
Time Magazine’s “In the Taliban Heartland,” features a series of pictures taken in Afghanistan, 
several of which feature young boys with guns.9 The fourth picture is of a child in uniform, 
carrying a gun with a poster of Osama bin-Laden, the token Islamist terrorist, behind him. 
Underneath the child’s face it reads “NEXT GENERATION JIHADI.” His face is partially 
covered by a large gun, showing half child, half militant. In “FOREIGN FIGHTERS,” a local 
boy looks up at the figure of an “Afghan Arab fighter,” whose face is cropped out of the frame. 
His large gun, however, is in full view and is angled towards the boy. The child draws his gaze 
upward towards the faceless man, with a look of curiosity, implying that the man is looking 
down towards him as well. There is an identification between the two, as if the child is looking 
towards his future. Male children are both demonized and victimized in the photo series; a 
juxtaposition of a child’s innocence and the evil that will corrupt him. The audience watches as 
bystanders and the solution seems clear: the young soldiers must be saved from themselves and 
their grown counterparts. Intervention is the moral solution. 
                                               
8 http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20011203,00.html 
9 http://content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,2052441_2244414,00.html 
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The arrangement of images in “Kabul Unveiled” similarly betrays a problematic 
narrative.10 It begins with an image of a lone woman walking through “the ruined urban sections 
of Kabul,” with her burqa billowing behind her; but as viewers click through pictures, the visual 
process of unveiling becomes apparent. Bare-faced women, identified as “feminists,” sit between 
their burqa-clad counterparts. Their alleged liberation and modernity is magnified when it is 
wedged between the tell-tale blue cloth of oppression. Pictures of women in burqas begging, 
with their hands extended to center of the frame as if they are begging directly to the audience, 
are interrupted by the final images of bare-faced nurses and professors in public spaces. The 
order of photos connote a before-and-after effect. Before US intervention, women were begging 
on streets and wandering aimlessly in a war-torn country incapable of rebuilding itself.  
Afterwards, they gained visibility and freedom from the burqa. One image shows women in blue 
burqas shopping for clothes in a market only selling blue burqas. The image of a salesman 
showing a woman her options amidst a homogeneous sea of the same shade of blue cloth elicits a 
sense of pity, and perhaps an ironic humor, for Afghan women’s lack of consumer freedom and 
individual expression. Afghan women are judged by Western modern conceptions of freedom as 
an individual choice in a market capitalist society. Cloud contends that, “taken together, these 
images encourage viewers to lament the status of Afghan women and support U.S. intervention” 
(294).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A critique of the Feminist Majority Foundation and the Bush administration raises a relevant 
concern of feminist NGOs role in imperial political projects affecting the Third World. 
Underlying motives for economic gain and geopolitical control are not simply defining 
characteristics of imperialism, they unequivocally define the essence of imperialism. 
Representations collapse women’s oppression into the Taliban and the burqa and conflate 
liberation with consumerism and Western feminism. Combined, these factors work together to 
hide US complicities in the current situation of women in Afghanistan and contradict the 
Feminist Majority’s own feminist politics. FMF and the Bush administration’s rhetoric go 
beyond mimicking a colonial understanding of the “clash of civilizations.” It reproduces the 
                                               
10 http://content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1947784_2013079,00.html 
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binary of “them” versus “us” within the context of the real motives and consequences of the 
“War on Terror.”  
Images can both figuratively and literally illustrate the clash of civilizations when 
deliberately situated alongside each other. Symbolic dramatization claiming women are 
“rejoicing” at their liberation shifts attention from the “historical and political to the cultural, 
from critical analysis to moral outrage” (L. Bush 2001; Russo 561). Herein lies the dangers of 
manipulating culture, an abstract entity, to a concrete thing. Histories of struggles, geopolitical 
motives and cultural abstracts cannot be neatly condensed into one visual frame. Moral outrage 
framed through a universal, feminism-as-humanitarianism framework assumes Western 
superiority, benevolence, and reinforces the East versus West binary. These narratives give just 
cause to unjust wars. Wars based on ideology and justified by vague concepts of universal 
morality are difficult to assess objectively and define, making them seem undefinable. In the 
context of Afghanistan and American relations, narratives centered on universal truths of 
morality and delusional interpretations of Afghanistan’s history undermine the root causes of the 
issues. Narratives can, and have, effectively justified military intervention. 
My thesis intends to demystify the ways in which popular depictions of Muslim women 
have functioned within 21st century political projects, yet it is not limited by its critical stance. 
Critiquing Western perceptions and narratives initiates an ongoing conversation which must 
include real Afghan women speaking on their own experiences and amplifying their voices. 
Debates on the status of Afghan women must be re-centered by asking broader questions which 
highlight structural and holistic issues facing Afghanistan. Rather than simply asking why 
women on the streets of Kabul must cover themselves in burqas, we must also ask why the 
streets of Kabul are crumbling under U.S. bombs and have yet to be rebuilt since 2003. My 
findings insist that feminist solidarity should be based on cultural and geography-specific 
histories of struggle and understood through the ways by which Afghan women navigate and 
engage these struggles daily. RAWA has given several Afghan women the platform to advocate 
on their own behalf in their respective communities. It is my sincere hope that Western popular 
and feminist narratives are similarly driven by Muslim women’s interpretation of their identity 
and freedom, amidst and beyond the “War on Terror.”  
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NOTES 
 
1. I refer to Sonali Kolhatkar, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Ann Russo among the several 
feminists who have critiqued the Bush administration’s appropriation of feminism. 
2. Reports of violence against women in Afghanistan under the Mujaheddin are extensively 
recorded by RAWA, Amnesty International, and the Human Rights Watch. 
3. The research of Michael Bhatia, Christopher Cramer, Jonathan Goodhand, Adam Pain, 
and Jo Grace among others have contributed to the developed scholarship on 
Afghanistan’s war economy.  
4. The Feminist Majority’s mission, campaigns,  published and archived work, and blog is 
accessible on their website.  
5. Marc Herold’s provides statistics on civilian casualties and deaths suffered by US bombs 
in “A dossier on civilian victims of United States' aerial bombing of Afghanistan. 
6. For reference, the picture of Afghan women in miniskirts is titled “Kabul, Before the 
Taliban” and can be viewed through the link provided.  
7. In 1982, anthropologist Hanna Papanek described the veil as “portable seclusion” which 
grants women the freedom of movement within male-dominated public spheres without 
compromising their moral obligations and sense of community belonging. 
8. In its December issue in 2001, Time published a cover of a bare-faced Afghan woman 
with the caption: Lifting the Veil: The Shocking Story of How the Taliban Brutalized the 
Women of Afghanistan. 
9. Time published a series of photographs titled “In the Taliban Heartland.” 
10. Time published a series of photographs titled “Kabul Unveiled.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
REFERENCES 
 
Abu-Lughod, Lila. Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Harvard University Press, 2013. 
“Afghanistan.” The World Bank, 2014, 
data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan?year_low_desc=true. 
Brodsky, Anne E. With All Our Strength: the Revolutionary Association of the Women of 
Afghanistan. Routledge, 2004. 
“Bush Administration's Rhetoric Does Not Match Reality on Global Women's Rights Issues.” 
Feminist Daily NewsWire, The Feminist Majority Foundation, 26 Aug. 2003, 
www.feminist.org/news/pressstory.asp?id=8011. 
Bush, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union . 29 
Jan. 2002, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29644. 
Bush, Laura. “The Weekly Address Delivered by the First Lady.” The American Presidency 
Project, 17 Nov. 2001, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid. 
“Claiming Afghan Women: The Challenge of Human Rights Discourse for Transnational 
Feminism.” Just Advocacy?: Women's Human Rights, Transnational Feminism, and the 
Politics of Representation , by Amy Erdman Farrell and Patrice McDermott, Rutgers 
University Press, 2005, pp. 33–55. 
Cloud, Dana L. “To Veil the Threat of Terror: Afghan Women and the Clash of Civilizations in 
the Imagery of the U.S. War on Terrorism.” Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 90, no. 3, 
2004, pp. 285–306. 
“Congressional Testimony of E. Smeal on the Plight of Afghan Women–Part I, II, III.” Feminist 
Daily NewsWire, The Feminist Majority Foundation, 10 Oct. 2001a, 
www.feminist.org/news/pressstory.asp?id=5861. 
Cramer, Christopher, and Jonathan Goodhand. “Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the 
State, and the 'Post-Conflict' Challenge in Afghanistan.” Development and Change, vol. 33, 
no. 5, 2002, pp. 885–909. 
Dobriansky, Paula. “‘Ask the White House.’” 10 Mar. 2005, 
www.whitehouse.gov/ask/20040310.html. 
Donini, Antonio, et al. Nation-Building Unraveled?: Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan. 
Kumarian Press, 2004. 
41 
Edwards, David B. Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad. University of California 
Press, 2003. 
Fielden, Matthew, and Jonathan Goodhand. “Beyond the Taliban? The Afghan Conflict and 
United Nations Peacemaking.” Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 1, no. 03, 2001, pp. 
5–32. 
“FMF: Obama Made Tough But Necessary Decision to Maintain U.S. Troops in Afghanistan.” 
Feminist Daily NewsWire, The Feminist Majority Foundation, 15 Oct. 2015, 
www.feminist.org/news/pressstory.asp?id=15684. 
Goodman, Ellen. “Demonizing the Women's March.” Boston.com, The Boston Globe, 2 May 
2004.  
“Hill Activity Increases on Behalf of Afghan Women.” Feminist Daily NewsWire, The Feminist 
Majority Foundation, 7 Nov. 2001b, 
march.feminist.org/news/newsbyte/uswirestory.asp?id=5925. 
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & 
Schuster, 1996. 
“In the Taliban's Heartland - Photo Essays.” Time Magazine, 
content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,2052441_2244420,00.html. 
“Interpreting the Taliban.” Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban, by William 
Maley, New York University Press, 1998, pp. 1–28. 
“Joint Statement on New Partnership Between U.S. and Afghanistan.” 28 Jan. 2002, 2001-
2009.state.gov/g/wi/8141.htm. 
Kabul, Before the Taliban. Kabul, 1970. 
“Kabul Unveiled - Photo Essays.” Time Magazine, 
content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1947784_2013079,00.html. 
Kandiyoti, Deniz. “Old Dilemmas or New Challenges? The Politics of Gender and 
Reconstruction in Afghanistan.” Development and Change, vol. 38, no. 2, 2007, pp. 169–
199. 
Kolhatkar, Sonali, and James Ingalls. Bleeding Afghanistan: Washington, Warlords, and the 
Propaganda of Silence. Seven Stories Press, 2006. 
Lerner, Sharon. “What Women Want: Feminists Agonize Over War in Afghanistan.” Village 
Voice, 31 Oct. 2001, www.warandgender.com/wgterror.htm. 
42 
Lucaites, John Louis, and Robert Hariman. Visual Rhetoric, Photojournalism, and Democratic 
Public Culture. Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 2001. 
“Mavis Leno to Chair Feminist Majority Foundation's Campaign to Stop Gender Apartheid.” 
Feminist Daily NewsWire, The Feminist Majority Foundation, 21 Oct. 1998, 
www.feminist.org/welcome/board/Mavis-Leno.htm. 
Miller, Elizabeth. “An Open Letter to the Editors of Ms. Magazine.” The Revolutionary 
Association of Women of Afghanistan, 21 Apr. 2002, 
www.rawa.org/tours/elizabeth_miller_letter.htm. 
Molyneux, Maxine, and Shahra Razavi. Gender Justice, Development, and Rights. 2002. 
“Negotiating with the Taliban Will Not Work and Will Produce Disastrous Results for Women 
and Afghanistan.” Feminist Daily NewsWire, The Feminist Majority Foundation, 21 May 
2012, www.feminist.org/news/pressstory.asp?id=13661. 
Office of the Senior Coordinator for International Women's Issues. U.S. Commitment to Afghan 
Women: The U.S.-Afghan Women's Council. U.S. Department of State, Jan. 2004, 2001-
2009.state.gov/g/wi/28108.htm. 
Pope, Hugh. “Afghani Rebels Win Gains Global Notice—Nation Attracts Formal Recognition, 
Oil Firms' Interest.” Wall Street Journal , 27 May 1996. 
Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia. I.B.Tauris & Co 
Ltd, 2008. 
Rostami-Povey, Elaheh. Afghan Women: Identity and Invasion. Zed Books, 2007. 
Rubin, Barnett R. “Political Elites in Afghanistan: Rentier State Building, Rentier State 
Wrecking.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 24, no. 01, 1992, pp. 77–99., 
doi:10.1017/s0020743800001434. 
Russo, Ann. “The Feminist Majority Foundation's Campaign to Stop Gender Apartheid.” 
International Feminist Journal of Politics, vol. 8, no. 4, 2006, pp. 557–580. 
Shahrani, Nazif M. “War, Factionalism, and the State in Afghanistan.” American Anthropologist, 
vol. 104, no. 3, 2002, pp. 715–722., doi:10.1525/aa.2002.104.3.715. 
Shams, Alex. “The Weaponization of Nostalgia: How Afghan Miniskirts Became the Latest Salvo 
in the War on Terror.” Ajam Media Collective, 10 Nov. 2017, 
ajammc.com/2017/09/06/weaponization-nostalgia-afghan-miniskirts/. 
43 
Shohat, Ella, and Inderpal Grewal. “On the New Global Feminism and the Family of Nations: 
Dilemmas of Transnational Feminist Practice.” Talking Visions: Multicultural Feminism in 
a Transnational Age, New Museum of Contemporary Art, 2001, pp. 501–530. 
“Text of First Lady Laura Bush's Remarks.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 31 Aug. 
2004. 
“Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics: Introduction.” Activists Beyond 
Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, by Margareth E. Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink, Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 1–38. 
United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Report on the 
Taliban's War Against Women .” Report on the Taliban's War Against Women , 2001. 
United States, Congress, Office of International Women's Issues, and April W. Palmerlee. “U.S. 
Department of State.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 28 Mar. 2002. 
2001-2009.state.gov/g/wi/9118.htm. 
Wehmeyer, Peggy, and Charlotte Ponticelli. “World Vision Radio.” World Vision Radio, 30 May 
2004. 
“Women Leaders Call for Expansion of International Peace Troops and More U.S. Funds to 
Restore the Rights of Afghan Women.” Feminist Daily NewsWire, The Feminist Majority 
Foundation, 8 Apr. 2002, www.feminist.org/news/pressstory.asp?id=6449. 
 
